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Riassunto 
Il processo che, in primo luogo, è coinvolto nell’acquisizione e nella gestione del 
significato è il pensiero. Conoscere la fisionomia del pensiero è premessa 
imprescindibile per affrontare il problema dello sviluppo delle abilità e delle 
competenze conseguenti ad un suo efficace esercizio in ambito didattico, sia da parte 
del docente che da quella del discente. 
 
Abstract 
The process that, in the first place, is involved in the acquisition and management of 
meaning is thought. Knowing the apperance of thought is indispensable premise to 
take on the problem of development of skills and consequent duties to its effective 
operation in education, both by the teacher that from that of the learner 
 
1. Thought as multidimensional reality 
The process that, in the first place, is involved in the acquisition 
and management of meaning is thought. Knowing the apperance 
of thought is indispensable premise to take on the problem of 
development of skills and consequent duties to its effective 
operation in education, both by the teacher that from that of the 
learner. These processes, of course, do not exhaust the factors 
which are crucial for the management of teaching in the classroom 
context, for example think to the space occupied by the relational 
dimension, but they are crucial because they make efficient 
processes giving value to the broadcast content. 
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The thought, being multidimensional, qualifies itself as a complex 
reality, so the operations it implements are not only computational, 
that is they can not be traced back to a limited and rigid symbolic 
elaboration, but call into question a much more complex process 
(Morin, 2007), which is not always justified by the exclusive 
reference to the laws of logic. The logic describes only a part of its 
range, that is its way of framing reality. 
The results which is reached through the exercise of thought does 
not concern an amount, simple and linear, of symbols and forms 
but the interaction, of reticular nature, between the meanings, that 
is a mutual influence between semantic elements of the system 
whose consequences they are limited predictable. Moreover, this 
interaction adjusts to certain criteria but, at the same time, helps to 
reformulate them, the thought is in effect a form of life. 
Learn through thought meains to perceive, represent, recognize, 
conceptualising, judging, reasoning (Morin, 2007). Such 
thoughtful acts, in their variety, stratify human thought making it 
as far removed there can be from a mechanical and deterministic 
process. Thought not passively returns the object of knowledge but 
is opens to new perspectives, never predetermined. Knowledge, in 
fact, does not rebuild the real but reflects it in a different reality, 
one in which the world and the subject, with his personal values, 
they meet, having mastered their intellectual capacity means being 
able to express themselves fully as person. Knowledge is always a 
phenomenon, as Kant said. 
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The thought does not act by following a single path but more paths 
in parallel. These parallel paths symbolize the four modes of 
thought, that is, the logic, the dialogic, analogic and ethics. 
In this paper, therefore, will be identify, in a synthetic way, the 
characteristic aspects of logical, dialogical, analogical and ethical 
thinking, as well as the relationships between these, by referring 
to certain processes which explain them. These processes allow 
the subject to formulate a personal "world view" using effective 
procedural models. 
Logical thinking acts resorts to the rules of formal logic, the 
dialogical enters into a relationship with the context and, finally, 
the analogical develops associations between semantic fields 
apparently far. 
The dialogical and analogical dimensions, in fact, fill the gaps of 
logical dimensionwhich, alone,  can not account for the 
complexity of thought that relates to reality (Perelman, Olbrecth - 
Tyteca, 1982). 
To move ahead with the argument, its possible puts an analogy 
between the three dimensions of language, traditionally found in 
the literature, that is, the syntax, the semantics and the pragmatics 
and problematic issues of formal logic and informal logic. These 
language’s dimensions will be a useful reference for 
understanding the systems under which the considerations relating 
to issues affecting the thought, and its ways of being, will move. 
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Traditionally it was believed that the thought would operate 
according to a logic, that is it recourses to precise rules of inference 
quite similar to those encoded, at least starting from Aristotle’s 
Organon (Johnson-Laird, 1990; Boniolo, Vidali, 2011). 
According to the theory of mental models of P. Johnson-Laird 
(1990), however, we reason by building models that are defined 
through the use of heuristic procedures, which putting aside the 
traditional inferential rules. These procedures are elaborations of 
the real data not strictly formal, related to the use of rules, but 
semantic and contextual, that is able to identify conclusions 
referring, respectively, to the meanings and to the situations, for 
this reason they are not easily generalizable. 
If we look at reality in a hermeneutical key, that is if we are aware 
that a circumstantial use of thought always creates an 
interpretation able to change reality, knowledge is no longer aimed 
at the possession of truth, but to  appropriation of the verisimilitude 
(or approximate truth ), that is of a representation that is close, as 
much as possible, to reality and that, for this, let us to live better. 
The truth, in absolute way, can not be the ultimate goal of the 
learning process, itself escapes too rigid representations and little 
articulated, always remaining at a distance from what they are 
talking about human representations, which often have to do with 
indeterminated semantic contents (Agazzi, 2012). 
What we know directly are neither the words nor the concepts but 
the experiences that shape them and to which they refer. 
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The subject experiences established "gestalts", that is structured 
sets of experiences, related to each other according to specific 
criteria, where everything is conceived as excessive in relation to 
the sum of the individual parts (Lakoff, Johnson, 2004). 
The concepts, and thus the things of the world, have no intrinsic 
properties but properties that the experienced, understood as a 
moment of reflection on the experiences of life, gives them, and 
who are forming in the experience, able to connote not only the 
essential definition but also cross-references, or elements of 
meaning, more peripheral. 
The reality, moreover, must be understood as a system of relations 
between things, and not as an isolated entity agglomerate together. 
These reports constitute the truth conditions of all thoughts or 
statements that derive from our personal model of reality. For 
example, I could be the custom to "make recycling" because "I 
recognize the urban environment as an extension of my body" 
because, by virtue of my interpretation of states of things, I 
identify a link between "my health and that of the natural 
environment", so " my reality" gives value to this relationship. 
The inherently subjective nature of the cognitive process, not 
hinder at the thought to fix the object according to valid 
representations also for others, and therefore able to be relevant 
even regardless of the context. 
We must, therefore, consider the two aspects that form the 
physiognomy of reality. The first "regards the purely physical 
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properties, objectively discernible things (...) The second aspect is 
the allocation of meaning and value to these things" (Watzlawick, 
1976, 129). It is in the latter case, however, that the problems 
related to the mental process modes assume a fundamental 
importance. 
Analyze, then, the salient features of:  
- formal logic or “logical” thinking that studies the reasoning, 
that is the shapes and structures in which it is expressed;  
- informal logic or “dialogical” thinking, which studies the 
implications that emerge within the arguments developed in 
concrete contexts (and not abstract as in the first case), as 
well as their margins of deviation from the general rule;  
- creative thinking or “analogical” thinking, establishing new 
meanings by relating the concepts and reformulating the 
interactions that take place between them  
- caring thinking or “ethics”, which connects the meanings 
and the emotional dimension of the ethical person, 
interpreting the exercise of reflexivity in terms of its being 
embodied thought. 
 
2. Logical thinking and dialogical thinking 
Let's start to discussion considering the classical formal logic (or 
axiomatic), that is the discipline that studies the forms of correct 
reasoning, translating them into a specific formal language, that is 
in an alphabet consisting of a finite set of symbols, whose meaning 
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is well established . The positive and, at the same time, the 
negative aspect of translation in formal linguistic notation is that 
this avoids any ambiguity reading and, therefore, of interpretation. 
Formal logic can be defined as "implicative", because it proceeds 
by implication, that is from logical consequence deducted in a 
strictly formal manner, considering exclusively the internal 
relations between the components of the argument. In this case to 
draw the consequences of an argument takes into account only its 
shape, or structure, regardless of content delivered through it. The 
form expresses an abstract model that relates the internal 
composition of an argument consists of premise and conclusion 
(Varzi, Nolt, Rohatyn, 2004). 
The concept of "correct reasoning" appears closely linked to that 
of “logical consequence”, which refers to the fundamental 
characteristic of the no-extensive, that is the fact that every 
inference never add anything that has not already implicitly 
expressed in the preamble (Benzi 2002), for which the value that 
the knowledge produces is only tautological, since it can not go 
beyond what is already contained in the premises. 
The logical reasoning acts like a paraphrase, relocating syntactic 
structures, for the purpose of better understanding, but without 
producing semantic changes. 
The only semantic rule concerning the allocation of true / false 
values to variables, which is to say that the meaning of 
R. Spedicato, The thought and its perspectives on realityLogic, dialogic, analogic and 
ethics, Mizar. Costellazione di pensieri, n. 4/2016, pp.  49-68 
 
 
56 
 
propositions can only be defined or as true or as false, not further 
specifications. 
A valid argument can also be completely made up false statements 
like the following: “All the horses fly” (P1), “Socrates is a horse” 
(P2) “Socrates flies” (C). The syllogism that derives from the use 
of the above propositions, however, is correct (Berto, 2007) 
because the conclusion is absent in the medium term (horse) that 
is present in the premises. 
The truth or, rather, the verisimilitude of reasoning is putt into the 
background compared to the validity of the latter. The concept of 
validity concerns the logic effectiveness of the reflective process, 
that is the deductive argument as a system of propositions, and 
takes place regardless of the truth of the individual propositions 
that compose it. 
Regardless of their semantic limit of formal logic, the inference 
rules are still useful to grasp the correctness of an argument, or to 
refute it, in case, establish as certain the truth of the premises, it 
should identify a conclusion without being able to relate to the 
context. 
The laws of formal logic are important because they allow to 
evaluate, using the tools of reflection, those insights that, 
otherwise, would result in wasteful knowledges, firmly anchored 
to the sole figure of perception. It is the distance from the context 
to characterize, both positively and negatively, formal logic. It 
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identifies, in fact, the regularity of the existing, that is those 
principles that can be inferred by way of progressive abstraction. 
The main obstacle to a flexible use of formal logic, also in 
education, resides precisely in its formalism, that is the 
characteristic that ensures it scientific rigor. Only referring also to 
argumentative structures of an informal nature may appear the 
relational dimension directly involved in the exercise of reason 
and, therefore, the dialogical aspect of thought. 
The term “informal logic” refers to all of the reasoning processes 
that are relevant the inferences from semantic and pragmatic 
origin, which deal respectively with the content and the context of 
utterance. That type of logic oversees the logical implications of 
the singularity of the real. 
The informal logic can be also defined as “presuppositional” 
because the rules that it identifies act, in the reflective process, 
referring to aspects of reality that are prerequisites, and that, 
therefore, act implicitly directing argumentative dialectic. 
In the syllogism exposed by SC Levinson (1993.19) “I am Greta 
Garbo, Greta Garbo is a woman, therefore I am a woman” will 
note that: a) the predicate "to be Greta Garbo" is extended to a set 
composed of one element, therefore, has a very specific meaning; 
b) the correctness of the argument depend on the identity of the 
speaker of the first premise and the conclusion, so paradoxically 
we should verify “in advance” the truth of the conclusion. 
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The singularity of the proposed example, which transcends the 
principles of generality of formal logic, depends on the fact that 
the term “Greta Garbo” references both to a subject to which a 
predicate because, at the same time, is a set and the only element 
forming part of the set. 
These “singularity” would not have arisen if the syllogism in 
question had been expressed in formal language, because this does 
not allow them to emerge. On the contrary, it should be noted that 
the role played by the word "I" depends on the formulation of the 
syllogism in natural language. 
When we speak of informal rules, that is pertaining to this specific 
form of thought, we refer to inferential habits and models 
frequently used for reasoning. 
According to C. Perelman and L. Olbrecth-Tyteca (1982), these 
rules can give rise to two types of arguments, those “almost 
logical” and those “based on the structure of reality”. The 
arguments “almost logical” need the help of logical laws to 
increase their argumentative force, thus assuming the 
demonstrative value that individually would not. 
The remaining arguments, defined as “based on the structure of 
reality”, however, reminiscent of the actual operating procedures, 
that is the semantic links that can be identified empirically 
reffering to the world’s experience. If the first emulate the logical 
laws, as in the case of the arguments of transitivity, the seconds 
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refer to the mechanisms that regulate the reality, of which it forms 
part, for example, the principle of cause-effect. 
To clarify what has just been report two examples. In the first case 
we apply a reasoning that assumes the principle of transitivity 
when, if we know that “Mario is a friend of Lucia” and “Lucia is 
a friend of Charles”, we believe that" Charles is a friend of Mario 
", although this is only probable. Instead, in the second case, we 
recognize the cause-effect principle of value when, seeing the 
happiness in the face of a friend, we are convinced of the fact that 
it is caused by something that happened to him during the day, that 
this hypothetical fact can it is taken as a cause of mood that we 
ascribe to him. 
Formal logic plays the cognitive process as an algorithm, divided 
into specific stages, making use of established rules and follow one 
another in a predetermined order, which gives rise to a 
demonstration. In contrast, the informal logic looks to the 
cognitive process intending it as a heuristic, a less restricted 
procedure, that is, as a search that continually reshapes, and that, 
rather, makes an argument, because it proceeds from premises 
only valid in precise contexts. 
If the argument were a mechanical process governed exclusively 
by the laws of formal logic does not explain two facts: 1) the 
tendency not to draw trivial and not very relevant conclusions, 
preferring to assert that no conclusion does not follow from the 
premises; 2) the great influence of the content of the statements to 
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which they apply the deductions (Dalla Chiara, Giuntini, Paoli, 
2004). 
For example, the theory of mental models of P. Johnson-Laird 
(1990) born to reject a vision of reasoning as in simple, logical 
calculus. It states that there is not an isomorphism between the 
inferential rules and actually practiced reasoning strategies, which 
are, largely, heuristics, especially since the issue that is played on 
the semantic ground. 
P. Johnson-Laird, then, is firmly convinced of the fact that one can 
make valid arguments without necessarily resorting to formal 
logic, and was able to test it in various ways. Among these 
arguments we can see a simple experiment in which he tested his 
students, who were confronted with the scenery expressed by the 
following statements: “The victim was stabbed to death in a 
cinema while attending an afternoon screening of the movie 
Bambi. When it was the crime the suspect was traveling in a train 
to Edinburgh "(Johnson-Laird, 1990, 107-108). When it was asked 
to them to speculate on who the murderess, P. Johnson-Laird was 
able to note that they made no use of inferential rules of a formal 
nature, to solve the problem, but rather sought to represent reality, 
expressed by the forward-looking statements, based on the 
meanings of the premises, trying to build a model that can simulate 
that. 
This model can be supported not only by rationality in the strict 
sense, but also by emotions, inventiveness, from sensible 
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experience. It is from the concrete relationship with the things that 
we are motivated to use the thought. 
 
3. The analogical thinking and caring thinking 
The exploration of the meaning of human life can not be achieved 
by resorting exclusively to empirical, logical or argumental 
verification, but it also needs to be nourished by sensitivity and 
imagination (Morin, 2001b). 
Knowledge is not only a consequence of the deduction or 
induction, but also of intuition (or insight). According to J. 
Davidson and R. Sternberg (1984) intuition consists of three 
specific moments: 1) the selective coding, which distinguishes the 
relevant information from those irrelevant; 2) selective 
combination, combining into an organic whole seemingly isolated 
information; 3) selective comparison, comparing new information 
with data already acquired. This cognitive process, in fact, is very 
similar to others but is distinguished by its original nature, and we 
could say still mysterious, of the criteria that guide it. 
It is precisely the intuitive problems, which require the use of 
creative thinking, to be “badly structured”, that is to be free of a 
procedure that clarifies the set of steps that can lead to a solution 
(Sternberg, Spear-Swerling, 1999). What solves these problems is 
precisely the ability to represent them in organically manner, that 
is to identify their structural. 
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In general, the brain's task is to organize information according to 
routine patterns, consolidated and codified, but when it is added a 
creative process of cognition the things change (De Bono, 2007). 
Among the characteristics of creative thinking, it will be 
considered especially analogical dimension, traditionally used by 
figures of speech such as simile and metaphor, which is valid 
especially for its ability to establish connections. 
By “analogy” means a reflective process which identifies and 
establishes the links between two constructs that are not normally 
associated. Although never rejoined the ranks of logical 
procedures, it was still the subject of interest from the 
philosophical and scientific thinking then. 
According to M. Johnson and G. Lakoff (2004) in particular the 
metaphorical procedure brings into being a creative process of 
formulation and is constitutive of reality not only of language but 
also of thought. Our behavior is often defined in analogy to the 
language that we use, it is structured through the metaphorical 
word reference. When we speak of a discussion as a war, using a 
structural metaphor, we mean that there is who attacks and who 
defends, who gaining ground, who coming to a yield, who 
dominates. Although there is no physical combat, we use the same 
images to refer to a verbal fight. Through the analogy drawn by 
the metaphor we only add to the literal meaning of a construct an 
additional significance, beyond those conventionally ascribed. 
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Creative thinking is serves to the metaphor because it is a tool to 
understand and to live something in terms of something else 
(Johnson, Lakoff 2004), allowing us to set up seemingly unusual 
comparisons. 
The metaphorical statement, far from to express nonsense, 
approaches to define the truth, maybe not empirical in the strict 
sense but above "noumenical", following argumentative paths 
from those of critical thinking (Prandi, 1994). 
The semantic distance, often, is not a fact of existing distance 
between the constructs, but is a direct consequence of the process 
of argumentation that is expressed in terms of an infinite 
negotiation and redefinition of the distances existing between the 
meanings, to establish new and possible implications. 
Build metaphors it requires both the ability to reflect on both the 
possession of imaginative abilities, as such expertise is not limited 
to language skills, but also calls into question the manipulation of 
conceptual structures, both experientally that for intellectual way. 
Creative thinking has in fact its own logic, which is based on the 
analogy process, which we could interpret as an identity 
incomplete, that is only partial, between two things that, at first 
glance, it may seems a "category’s error" (Lipman, 2005). What 
allows us to attribute the argument value to analogy is its ability to 
identify, and sometimes assert, structural similarities (Perelman 
similarities, Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1982), between two elements that 
can initially seem only juxtaposed.  
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The thinking processes that make use of analogical dimension are 
used frequently when the subjects, building hypotheses, try to 
predict the reality to better address the impact it will have on their 
lives. That is why, not only the reality, but also a likely possibility 
has the right to be the object of our thoughts. 
In the end it will be reffered to ethical thinking. For the purposes 
of discussion, for ethical thinking it means a subjective attitude 
reasonably guided by the values, both basic ones from those 
circumstantial. 
Ethics, in this case, relates to the allocation process and 
recognition of the value to the various states of affairs, the conduct 
and the parties. 
The dimension of values is, in fact, an important component for 
the formulation of the judgments, which means that the term 
"ethics" should not be interpreted as relating only objective 
knowledge of what is good. 
As shown by H. Putnam (1985), taking into account a banal 
statement like "The cat is on the mat", we can see the intersection 
of facts and values in judicial decisions. Our ability to understand 
the statement in question, due to the fact that our culture has 
attributed a significant value not only to the dichotomy "animal / 
non-animal" but also to the particular way of being of the animal, 
having proceeded to the classification by species (which makes us 
to distinguish a cat from a dog, a cat, but also by a tiger). When 
we describe a fact, the resulting judgment assumes, always, the 
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presence and influence of certain values. The statement of the 
example, then, is the bearer of an implicit system of values. 
We should note that it is difficult to distinguish the aspects that, in 
the judgment, are determined by the level axiological, if we 
consider the mutual influence between this and all other layers that 
make up the meaning of something. 
The attribution of value to an object can still be conditioned by 
rational reasons, but often is simply justified by the existence of a 
personal connection with the object. 
The thrill and the caring attitude are not simple epiphenomena of 
value judgment, but its integral part, because through them the 
person exercises specific mental acts as "sifting, filtering, 
measuring, weighing" (Lipman, 2005, 294) . The system of criteria 
that guides ethical thinking, and based mental acts mentioned a 
moment ago, is configured as different from person to person, 
because it is strictly about both the personal experiences that the 
subjective value-convictions, compared to what it means to "live 
well" . Emotional conflicts arise, in fact, lack of awareness and 
understanding of the criteria that guide this intelligence, which 
allows us to understand how to harmonize with each other the 
values (Nussbaum, 2004) to respect the ontological equality of 
things, ie their equal right to assert as an object of reflective 
judgments. 
Judging in terms of the values allows us to use as a means of 
knowledge also the emotional experience of others and rational, is 
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coming to reinforce our conviction that to abandon them in favor 
of that to which the other attribute value, making it articulated our 
particular judgment . 
Thanks to using the values thought that the reflexive skills can 
translate into responsible exercise of sociability and promotion of 
personality. 
teaching objective of the action is to stabilize the use of a form of 
wider rationality that define "reasonable", to indicate that it not 
only includes the logical-formal criteria but accepts the influence 
operated by the context. 
The reasonable judgment is, therefore, the product of the synthesis 
between the provision of formal and informal rules of logic, 
creative reformulation and the impact of the attitude values staff. 
The deepening of this concept is fundamental to the development 
of the reflections focused on its application in the training and 
educational field. 
A reference that allows us to understand the formation of the 
exercise also thought of aesthetic education as a process, in which 
the beauty is all that can be taken as a tangible sign of the 
agreement between reason and sensibility (Pareyson, 2005), and 
allowing to overcome the dichotomy between feeling and 
thinking, considering them part of a single reality that is able to 
integrate in a balanced manner algorithmic and heuristic 
procedures. 
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